Markus Wagner, from the University of Vienna, presented a paper with the following abstract:
“Critics of the IMF have raised concerns that IMF programs undermine democracy in the countries where the Fund intervenes. But although voters are central for questions of democratic governance, existing research does not directly examine how voters evaluate the costs and benefits of such external interventions. Our analysis uses an experimental approach to assess competing theories about the impact of IMF interventions on voters and the mechanisms behind this relationship. Our results from surveys in Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain show that – with the exception of Greece – approval of fiscal adjustment among voters is higher with than without IMF intervention. This is the case because voters expect that the crisis is more likely to be solved when the IMF intervenes. At the same time, voters are critical of the constraints that an IMF intervention imposes on the government’s room to maneuver. Taken together, however, the hope that the crisis can be resolved with the IMF generally dominates the dissatisfaction over the loss of democratic control.”
